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One of the ladies in our group has, for years, worn a pair of wooden shoes and is quite enamored with them. I have noticed a few more pairs in the camps and some time ago I began to mildly ponder the propriety of such things. While reading the “New York Journal” for 6 July 1775, I came across an article about a dinner with General Wooster and the officers of the Connecticut line. It listed the toasts offered up during the dinner and one, in particular, caught my eye: Death and Jack Boots, before Dishonour and Wooden Shoes. This raised my brow a bit as it indicates they held a rather negative view of wooden shoes so I decided to keep track of any comments on said shoes that I came across and here are ones that I found.

As to the country people [of France], as well as many in the towns, they are very poor; more than half of them go bare- foot all their lives, the greatest part of the remainder with wooden shoes, and some very few with leather.

[extract of a letter from William Clarendon, Rouain, France, to a friend, London, 10 Oct. 1764 (“The Newport Mercury;” 28 Jan. 1765, p1)]

The Memory of our brave Country-Men who so gallantly defended Derry against King James, preferring the worst of Deaths (Famine) to a Popish Stuart, Brass Money and wooden Shoes.

[one of several toasts offered up at an entertainment celebrating the Feast of St. Patrick (“Boston Post Boy;” 23 March 1767; p3)]

A Correspondent speaking of the Exportation of Calve Skins, says, the Ministry finding they cannot make real slaves of
the Americans, have form’d the design of making them so in Appearance, and not as common slaves, but those of the most abject kind, viz. like the vassals of France, in Wooden shoes.

[opinion piece (“New-Hampshire Gazette;” 11 August 1769; p2)]

For, should the diabolical Doctrine of Roman Catholics, or Popery, take Place; wooden Shoes, Fetters, Chains, Racks, burning to Death, with every other hellish Torture practiced in the infernal INQUISITION, would be the Lot of those who should deny a single Article of the blasphemous Creed of the Church of Rome.

[ad for reprinting a book on Catholicism (“The Boston News- Letter;” 11 Feb 1773; p4)]

That the customs of France is the thing they must choose, Such as arbitrary power and curs’d wooden shoes; That they made Popish laws, we all know to be true;

So d—n the old parliament, heigh! for a new!

[song verse (“Norwich Packet;” 15-22 Dec. 1774; p4)]

I will suppose for a moment, that the Legislature should establish it as a law, that all the people for the future shall wear wooden shoes. In this case there would be no subordination; but my wooden shoes would not be any more agree- able to me because all my fellow-citizens are obliged to wear wooden shoes too.

[opinion piece (“Independent Chronicle;” 6 April 1780; p1)]

The total alteration in the French Government, will render a revisal and alteration of most of our comedies and farces, ab- solutely necessary—all the jokes about wooden shoes, slavery, and the Grand Monarque, that were wont to set honest John Bull in a roar, having, happily for our Gallic neighbours, lost all their point.

[commentary on the French Revolution (“New-York Daily Ga- zette;” 5 Oct. 1789; p2)]

While this is a quite small sampling, none of them give a positive view of wooden shoes. In fact, most of them refer to the people of France wearing wooden shoes. None of them indicate English or Americans wore them. Further, I haven’t found a single mention of wooden shoes in droves of runaway and deserter ads. Since those typically mention all sorts of things in their clothing descriptions and wooden shoes seem to be unusual enough to warrant mention, the lack of their inclusion leads me to believe that nobody had them on.

The geography of the quotes also caught my eye. All of them are from northern papers. I found no mention of wooden shoes in papers from the middle-Atlantic or the south. Granted, there are more papers from the north available and I spend the majority of my time reading them but, I do spend time looking at papers from other regions. In part, I attribute the northern distribution and the negative attitude to the proximity of Canada with its French and Catholic culture and the lingering effects of the French and Indian War on northern colonies/states.

While I found little mention of wooden shoes in English North America, I did find droves of ads for clogs— wooden-soled shoes with cloth or leather uppers and no back around the heel. Leather may have been more common but there are several ads for “brocaded clogs” so cloth uppers certainly existed. Also, I came across a couple ads for “silk tied clogs” whatever those may be.

This certainly has not been an exhaustive study on my part but I did come away with a couple impressions based on what I have read. It seems wooden shoes would not have been at all common for English or Americans. The only mentions of them are from the north and relate to French of the lowest class and Catholics—groups to which few English or Americans would care to admit belonging. Clogs might be more appropriate but there are far more ads for clogs in the 1760s and early 70s than during the period of the war so they prob- ably would not be all that common. Lastly, it seems that only women and children wore them. Final impression: use them for kindling.

Copyright © 2010 Joe Wagner. All rights reserved.

Logistics: “. . the branch of military science dealing with the procurement, maintenance, and movement of equipment, supplies, and personnel.”

PART TWO –TRANSPORT & FORAGE

The success or failure of a Quartermaster General (QMG) was largely judged on his ability to bring support to the troops while in winter camp and keeping them supplied on the move during the summer campaign.
The very center of the logistical problems of the Revolution lay in the transportation of equipment and supplies or the failure thereof. Washington later cited General Nathaniel Greene for the “great facility” he displayed in transporting and supporting the army from the Valley Forge camp to the Monmouth battlefield, and on to the Hudson Highlands in the 1778 campaign. His praise stands out as the exception amidst a difficult process that the Continental Army would never really master.

The policy throughout the war was to move goods by boat wherever possible. But the British navy largely controlled the seacoast, and the vast majority of supplies moved by road, even over such long distances as between the southern colonies and New England. In this Part II on Logistics, we’ll break down our discussion of Transport into Land and Water, followed by the topic of Forage.

As noted in Part I of this series, the army at Boston in 1775 did not require large amounts of transport, since they were in static positions besieging the city.

Nevertheless, Washington had designated a Wagonmaster General for the

Army in August 1775. His name was John Goddard, and he had already played a role at the start of the war for independence. It was he who delivered the arms and munitions from Boston to Concord that the British were after when they took the road to Lexington and Concord on April 19th, 1775.

When Boston fell in March 1776, Goddard’s work really began. Washington decided that New York was the likely target of British troops. It was necessary to quickly move the army to the threatened city. Goddard, using Washington’s influence, obtained from Massachusetts the loan of 300 wagons to transport the army. They were organized into 10 brigades of thirty teams each. The procedure for keeping track of supplies enroute set a pattern for future conduct of the transportation department. It was a common problem in transport in the colonies that portions of a load would disappear, being sold or abandoned by the driver whenever the opportunity or need arose.

To forestall this problem with the army’s goods, in addition to brigade wagonmasters, who were in operational command of the drivers and wagons, each brigade had a “conductor” serving as a freight agent, responsible for everything loaded in his 30 wagons. The conductor recorded each driver’s name, place of residence, and wagon contents. At the end of the journey, the conductor verified the arrival of the same contents at the New York camp. Once the driver had this bill of lading signed by the conductor, he would be paid for his work.

After the fall of New York, once again Washington had to call upon a colony for help. This time, New York authorized him to impress (take by force) whatever wagons and animals he could find in the counties of Duchess and Westchester, along his route of march. Apparently this provided little relief, since there was a great loss of materiel during the retreat across New Jersey in the fall of 1776. The original Wagonmaster General Goddard drops from the scene and apparently had returned to Massachusetts sometime before the battle of Long Island.

Congress provided authority for a Continental Army Wagonmaster General in the spring of 1777. Because of the capture of Philadelphia, the catastrophic departure of QMG Mifflin in the fall, and the delay in his replacement, no candidate took the field until spring 1778. As noted in Part I of this series, Mifflin’s failure to provide a Wagonmaster responsible for transporting supplies to Valley Forge was a key cause of the disaster there. This management failure combined with the poor quality of roads into and around Valley Forge. During the month of February 1778, not a single supply wagon reached the camp at Valley Forge.

“Almost every species of camp transportation is now performed by men, who without murmur, patiently yoke themselves to little carriages of their own making, or load their wood and provisions on their backs”

Letter from Congressional Committee to President of the Congress, Valley Forge, 12 February 1778.

In the spring of 1778, after General Greene had become QMG, a James Thompson was named as Wagonmaster General. We have no information on his background, but he had apparently been acting as a Wagonmaster for Washington in an unofficial capacity as far back as late 1777. He served as a civilian, with no military rank, until the reorganization of the department in 1780. We told in Part I of the tremendous growth of the QMG under Greene– and the wagon department was doing its share. Records indicate that by 1780 there were 125 wagonmasters overseeing some 450 wagoneers and packhorsemen with the main Army.

The vast majority of these drivers were enlisted men either taken from line units or from militia units as they were leaving Continental service. They were paid a bounty to join the wagon corps, plus a pay equivalent to line enlisted pay. Both Washington and his QMG preferred to obtain drivers from civilian sources – not drawing down the troop strength, but they simply could not pay the wages demanded by the civilian market. QMG Greene reported to Washington that his actual need was for over 1,000 wagoneers.

It’s instructive to look at the structure that Wagonmaster General Thompson was attempting to provide to the Army, to see how much transport a Continental regiment or brigade actually needed. The following details the number of wagons authorized per brigade:

Brigadier Commanding – 1, tools and equipment – 1, ammunition – 1, forges/blacksmith – 2, commissary – 4, forage – 4, line regiments – 4 each, (usually 4 regiments per brigade) – 16. Total of 29.

For the nineteen brigades of the main army, it means 551 teams, and this excludes the artillery, which had a requirement for over 230 teams of its own. The headquarters, engineers, sappers, cavalry, artificers, hospital, and other specialty units needed some 200 more. The grand total for Washington’s main army during the campaign of 1780 was 1,071 wagon teams.

As the war moved into 1779 and 1780, the lack of funds and massive depreciation of continental currency took its toll on transport. Where wagons were available, drivers could not be hired at the wages offered. Hard money was not available, and the usual source of animals and wagons – the local farmer – wasn’t available unless hard currency was offered. In April 1780, while still in winter camp at Morristown, NJ, QMG Greene informed Washington that there would be no transport to move his army into the field.

He simply did not have the men or animals under con- tract to do the job. In June, for the first time on a large scale, Washington resorted to impressments orders to obtain transport. He ordered Henry Knox into neighboring counties of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where they seized some 250 wagons and teams to move supplies.

In September 1780, a line military officer was selected to serve as the main army Wagonmaster. He was Major Thomas Cogswell, and the transport task would be his until the end of the war. Another important change in 1780 was that, as noted in Part I, because of the failure of the QMG to obtain supplies without funding, the colonies were tasked with directly providing for the army’s supply needs, and the Wagonmaster’s department would carry those supplies to the army wherever it resided.

Transport for the campaign of 1781 was achieved by a combination of cajoling the colonial governments for men and wagons, promises of payment with specie, and the ever more necessary impressment orders. An example of the process survives in the form of an impressment order for 100 horses deliverable to the artillery (Knox), to be executed in certain counties of Pennsylvania. It was decided to use oxen teams for the normal army supply wagons, while saving the horse teams for artillery and cavalry support.

The needs for transport were completely transformed with the sudden decision in early August 1781 to move the entire main army to Virginia for an attack on the Chesapeake at Yorktown. No longer were movement needs measured in tens of miles. Suddenly the entire American and French forces must be quickly sent some 600 miles to Virginia. During August, the army trans- ported over 700 tons of supplies and equipment from throughout New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania to the transshipment point at Head of Elk, MD on the Chesapeake. With the French fleet controlling the Chesapeake, most supplies could go by ship down to the James River below Yorktown.

It was decided to also send a wagon train south by land, since the availability of transport in Virginia was reported to be worse, if possible, than in New Jersey. At least 75 wagons were sent along this route. That the situation in Virginia had been reported accurately is obvious from orders issued by Washington from Williamsburg in mid- September that all officers should turn over their personal wagons or other transport for use in hauling ammunition to the Yorktown lines. Although the troops and much of their camp supplies arrived by ship, the transfer of the massive amounts of armament and supplies from the French fleet necessary for the siege had to be brought overland from the James river anchorage. It was not until the arrival of the wagons sent by land from New York, that this problem was solved in mid-October.

With the close of the Yorktown campaign, the need for large and immediate amounts of transport for the army greatly declined. For the rest of the war, the transport department used the practice of selling off livestock and material to finance the operations of the remainder needed to support the army until 1783 and the end of the war.

Water Transport.

The use of water as a transport vehicle was an established practice of the colonial settlers since the beginnings of America. The skills for building small river and lake-going craft were widespread among the colonists, and every- thing from canoes to schooners were plying the waterways of the eastern seaboard. The first use of shipping by the Continental Army even pre-dated the Boston siege, when in June 1775, sup- plies were shipped up the Hudson by schooner to Gen. Schuyler at Fort Ticonderoga.

Rivers and streams often impeded the movement of the army, since at the beginning of the Revolution there was not a single bridge over any significant river in the entire 13 colonies. Many smaller streams had bridges, but ferries were much more common. Floating bridges (pontoons) were sometimes constructed, but they required so much transport and effort, that often they could not be used in a timely manner.

Use of existing ferries, as with all things in the colonies, was on a cash basis. They were operated by independent owners, who charged by the trip, and the wider the stream to be crossed, the higher the fee. The army spent so much time along the Hudson River during the war that from about 1779, the QM department created its own ferry network, to allow free passage for continental forces. One of the Quartermaster’s responsibilities while on the march was to see that needed ferries were prop- erly manned and ready to transport the forces, and that lacking such, as many boats as needed were gathered to perform the task.

In 1779 the expanding QM under Greene created the Boat Department. By campaign season 1779, water transport available to the army included four schooners, seventeen Durham boats (similar to large pirogues), and numerous scows and rowboats. These resources were located at two ferry locations on the Susquehanna, one on the Potomac, two on the Schuykill, and other places along the Delaware about Philadelphia. Separate fleets were operated in New England and along the Canadian routes such as Lake Champlain.

By the time of greatest need – the Yorktown campaign of 1781 – these resources were greatly diminished. The first need was to move 7,000 American and French troops from the Hudson River area and New Jersey down to the Head of Elk for embarkation down the Chesapeake. The forces gathered at Trenton, on the Jersey side of the Delaware, and were moved by a fleet of approximately 30 scows and flatboats down to the Christiana Bridge (near present-day Newark, Delaware). From there they marched to Head of Elk.

To carry the army down the Bay, Washington person- ally enlisted every influential personage he knew in the Bay area. He had Robert Morris in Baltimore seeking ships from his merchant friends, the Maryland governor, Thomas S. Lee providing influence to assist, and to various Eastern Shore gentlemen and merchants who had vessels available. Movement of most of the army, its artillery, stores, and equipment, took place by water, moving from Head of Elk, Maryland down the Bay to the James River, Virginia, between September 10 and September 23, 1781. Once at Yorktown, it required a consider- able fleet to provide supplies and transport for the allied armies operating on the James-York River peninsula. There are several impressment orders issued during this period in Virginia, for boats to serve both the American army and to move goods from the French fleet to shore positions about Yorktown. As with land transport, the winding down of the war saw boats and equipment being sold off to support the much diminished needs of the last years of the war.

The Forage Department

If transport was the crux of the overall Continental supply problem, the heart of the transport problem was forage. If you could not feed the animals that pulled the wagons, nothing moved. In the opening year or two of the war, there was little involvement of the Army QMG in forage matters. Traditionally, the owners of the transport were responsible for forage for their animals. So long as civilian contractors made up the bulk of transport sources, the army had no need to involve itself. During the reign of QMG Mifflin (1775-77), nothing was done to provide consistent forage, even for the Army’s own animals in use by the cavalry and artillery.

By the end of 1777, deep in the supply disaster that be- came the winter at Valley Forge, Washington recognized the need for an organization devoted to supplying forage. He named Clement Biddle as Forage master for his army. By spring 1778, there were 45 members on his staff, responsible for gathering and distributing forage within the army. Forage magazines were established at Berks, Lancaster, and Northampton, PA, Chatham, Princeton, and Trenton, NJ, and a transfer station at Head of Elk to receive supplies from Virginia and Maryland.

The term forage was applied to the grains used to feed both horses and oxen. It consisted of corn, oats, hay, other grains, and wheat and by-products of wheat threshing. Wheat was last to be used, since it was also important to the feeding of the troops themselves. Throughout the war, there were always, in the mind of the Forage master, too many horses about the camp. There are continuous edicts that officer’s horses and other army support animals must be removed from the camp during winter stand-downs, so as not to require the import of vast quantities of forage.

The desired solution was to move the animals out into the countryside for wintering, allowing them to live on local grasses and hay, requiring much less transport and supply. Of course, the officers would have none of that. As quoted from Continental Army Brig, Gen. Alexander McDougall, “every branch of a department had horses sufficient for a Field Marshall’s suite.” It was also necessary to keep what animals and wagons were available at camp to move food and other supplies necessary for the troops.

The importance of forage was made evident in the wintering of the army in 1778-79. Due almost entirely to lack of animal forage, Washington had to disperse the army throughout New Jersey, the Hudson region of New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Cavalry animals were moved as far away as Winchester. VA for the winter. The forage master estimated the total Continental Army horse population at over 10,000 animals. By spring 1779, the same problem of inflated currency and lack of any funding from Congress that hurt the other logistics areas also affected the forage department. Also, from four years of war, the middle colonies were greatly depleted of forage and the means to move it.

More and more, forage grains were shipped up the Chesapeake Bay from Virginia and Maryland through Head of Elk. In 1779-80, some 200,000 bushels of grain, mostly Indian corn, were sent from Virginia to Head of Elk. Britain’s off and on naval control of the Bay only added to the uncertainty.

As with the other logistical solutions, the use of impressments grew as other options failed. The state of Pennsylvania issued impressment authorizations to Washington in 1779, and direct impressments by the army without state authorization also became common. Washington always hated to do it, and was reluctant to order it be- cause he wanted the goodwill of the population. Virtually all of the forage obtained for the main army camp in 1780 was obtained by impressments. The disagreeable process involved can be glimpsed in a letter from QMG Pickering to Congress. The supply of forage at New York was obtained by “military authority which has lately occasioned bloodshed.”

From 1780 on, Congress solved the supply problem by handing it over to the individual states to support the forces in their areas. For the winter camp of 1780-81, which was in the highlands of New York, on the Hudson, western Massachusetts and Connecticut were to be the primary source of forage. To aid the effort, the Forage master Biddle moved large numbers of cavalry and supply animals to Berks and Lancaster County, PA. When the campaign of 1781 to Virginia got underway, once again impressment was the standard approach for forage supply. “a warrant of impress, I fear, will be for the most part your only resource.”

QMG Pickering to Deputy Forage master William Keese

To ease the pain for the Maryland and Virginia farmers and merchants from whom the supplies would be taken, the QMG issued 525 specie certificates, which served as promise of payment for items taken. By the end of the war, Washington and many other officers were purchasing their horses’ forage with their own funds.

Copyright © 2010 Joe Wagner . All rights reserved.

Although supported by historical fact, it is still not widely known that the assistance of Spain and her colonies was an important factor in the triumph of the American Revolution .This being the Fall issue of our newsletter, I would like to present in its spaces a few sample “bullets” on contributions which took place, appropriately, during the late Summer and early Fall throughout the conflict, and let our readers do the judging.

Spain had been assisting the revolutionaries ever since they declared independence in 1776, however, it did not declare war against England until June 21, 1779.

Once Spain entered the war, 42 of its warships joined a French squadron to form the spearhead of a planned invasion of England. The combined fleet numbered 65 warships and it penetrated the English Channel on 14 August1779. The British home defense fleet numbered 35 units and it kept avoiding combat. However, one of its units, the 74 gun “Ardent” did come out on 17 August, in the mistaken belief that it was heading to a rendezvous with its own. Immediately, French frigates “Juno” and “Chantil”, and the Spanish “Princesa” fell upon the unsuspecting “Ardent” and captured it after a 15 minute fight within sight of land. The demoral- izing effect these developments must have had upon the English public cannot be discounted. It was the first time anything like it had ever happened in their waters!

Between August 27 and September 24, 1779; thirty year old Spanish Brigadier Bernardo de Gálvez, Governor of Spanish Louisiana, captured eight British forts, eight naval units, and close to 1,000 men, ending the British presence in the lower Mississippi. With this action, Gálvez preempted a British offensive against New Orleans which intended to capture and close the Missis- sippi, then basically, the only major supply route left for General Washington’s armies. (1)

On 9 August 1780, Spanish Admiral Luís de Córdoba encountered a 52 ship British convoy sailing off the Azores, escorted by a ship-of the line and two frigates. A total of 55 vessels in all. They were transporting thou- sands of men and war materiel to Jamaica and other Caribbean islands, and to Bombay and Madras, India, and St. Helens island.

Córdoba ordered the chase, which resulted in his fleet capturing all of the transports. The escorting ships fled. This was the largest convoy loss England suffered during all of the 18th Century. Córdoba would go on to further fame in July of the following year, when he would capture a 19 ship convoy right in the English Channel!

From July to August 1781, and after a series of meetings in Sainte Domingue with French Admiral de Grasse, Spanish Royal Commissioner Don Francisco de Saavedra y Sagronis gives him his full and complete support. De Grasse was headed to Yorktown, to help in the siege against Lord Cornwallis there. Saavedra assisted him in the following manner. He:

… appropriated 100,000 pesos for the Admiral, from the yearly Mexican monetary allotments of Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo. De Grasse needed the money to resupply and outfit his ships for the upcoming campaign against the British fleet that was expected to come to rescue Cornwallis…

… released the French troops of the Marquis de Saint Simon, men experts in siege warfare then deployed to the Spanish service, so they could bring their skills to Yorktown…

…arranged for Spanish Admiral José de Solano y Bote, then in Cuba, to take over the protection of the French colonies in the Caribbean with his 16 sail-of the-line. This allowed de Grasse to mobilize his whole squadron to confront the British fleet… (2)

…more importantly, when de Grasse requested more funds, this time to help pay for the French and American efforts at Yorktown, he suggested that they go to Havana, Cuba, to seek them. Once disembarked, however, they were informed that the treasury did not have the funds, but that if they so desired, they could make a public subscription to see if they obtained the 500,000 pesos de Grasse calculated he needed.

In six hours, 28 donors provided 4,000,000 reales, an amount equivalent to the 500,000 pesos de Grasse hoped to get. In 1990 dollars this would be $15,000,000, more or less. The reales weighted so much that when deposited at the house occupied by the French commissary-in-chief Claude Blanchard, they completely destroyed the ground floor and ended strewn around in the basement, along with the sole guard protecting them.

Some of those coins are still being found in archeological digs in Yorktown. They are considered by historian Stephen Bonsal (“ When the French Were Here”) as part of the “…bottom dollars upon which the edifice of American independence was erected…”

(1) On 27 August, Brigadier Bernardo de Gálvez, Governor of Spanish Louisiana goes on the offensive against all the British outposts in the lower Mississippi, with an army comprised mostly of militia. The British had been preparing to capture New Orleans and St. Louis, Missouri, which was also Spanish, in order to control the Mississippi River then a major route for the delivery of Spanish supplies to the revolutionaries. Gálvez’s own officers had recommended a defensive posture, instead of going on the offensive with such untried forces. But, by September 27, Gálvez had already captured all of the British forts in the lower Mississippi including Ft, Bute in Manchac; Ft. Baton Rouge; Ft Panmure in Natchez; and other outposts in the Amite River and Thomson Creek. In addition several British ships carrying rein- forcements to said outposts were taken, plus in a boarding action, the frigate “West Florida” which patrolled Lake Pontchartrain and was the most powerful warship then in the area. The final tally was; eight forts; eight ships; close to 1,000 men and officers captured; to Gálvez’s loss of one man dead and one wounded. This ended the British pres- ence in the lower Mississippi, and the threat against New Orleans.

(2) Since the Spanish were not allies but only co-belligerents of the revolutionaries, they \declined a prior request by de Grasse to unite their squadron to his, and sail to battle the British fleet in support of the Yorktown campaign.

Copyright © 2010 Héctor L. Díaz. All rights reserved.

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We know that besides being uncomfortable, ticks also can spread disease, most commonly known diseases are Lyme Disease, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, and Southern Tick Associated Rash to name a few. An ounce of prevention can keep you from becoming one of the statistics.

Some species and some life stages of ticks are so small that they can be difficult to see, but all hungrily look for animals and people to bite. Depending on the species, you can find ticks in various environments, often in or near wooded areas. You may come into contact with ticks when walking through infested areas or by brushing up against infested vegetation (such as leaf litter or shrubs). Ticks also feed on mammals and birds, which play a role in maintaining ticks and the pathogens they carry.

Protect Yourself from Tick Bites: Know where to expect ticks. Ticks live in moist and humid environments, particularly in or near wooded or grassy areas. You may come into contact with ticks during outdoor activities around your home or when walking through vegetation such as leaf litter or shrubs. Always walk in the center of trails, in order to avoid ticks.

Use a repellent with DEET (on skin or clothing) or permethrin (on clothing) and wear long sleeves, long pants and socks. Products containing permethrin can be used to treat boots, clothing and camping gear which can remain protective through several washings. Repellents containing 20% or more DEET (N, N-diethyl-m-toluamide) can be applied to the skin, and they can protect up to several hours. Always follow product instructions! Parents should apply this product to their children, avoiding the hands, eyes, and mouth.

Wear light-colored clothing, which allows you to see ticks crawling on your clothing.

Tuck your pant legs into your socks so that ticks can-not crawl up inside of your pant legs. Some ticks can crawl down into shoes and are small enough to crawl through most socks. When traveling in areas with lone star ticks (which are associated with Southern tick-associated rash illness, ehrlichiosis, and possibly Rocky Mountain spotted fever) you should examine your feet and ankles to ensure that ticks are not attached.

Perform Daily Tick Checks
Check your body for ticks after being outdoors, even in your own yard. Conduct a body check upon return from potentially tick-infested areas by searching your entire body for ticks. Use a hand-held or full-length mirror to view all parts of your body and remove any tick you find. Check these parts of your body and your child’s body for ticks:

• Under the arms
• In and around the ears
• Inside belly button
• Back of the knees
• Under the arms
• In and around the hair
• Between the legs
• Around the waist

Check your children for ticks, especially in the hair, when returning from potentially tick-infested areas. See the list above for the places on your child’s body to check for ticks. Remove any tick you find on your child’s body

To Remove Attached Ticks:

1. Use fine-tipped tweezers or notched tick extractor, and protect your fingers with a tissue, paper towel, or latex gloves (see figure). Persons should avoid removing ticks with bare hands.
2. Grasp the tick as close to the skin surface as possible and pull upward with steady, even pressure. Do not twist or jerk the tick; this may cause the mouthparts to break off and remain in the skin. (If this happens, remove mouthparts with tweezers. Consult your health care provider if illness occurs.)
3. After removing the tick, thoroughly disinfect the bite site and wash your hands with soap and water.
4. Do not squeeze, crush, or puncture the body of the tick because its fluids may contain infectious organ-isms. Skin accidentally exposed to tick fluids can be disinfected with iodine scrub, rubbing alcohol, or water containing detergents.
5. Save the tick for identification in case you become ill. This may help your doctor make an accurate diagnosis. Place the tick in a sealable plastic bag and put it in your freezer. Write the date of the bite on a piece of paper with a pencil and place it in the bag.Folklore Remedies Don’t Work!Folklore remedies, such as the use of petroleum jelly or hot matches, do little to encourage a tick to detach from skin. In fact, they may make matters worse by irritating the tick and stimulating it to release additional saliva or regurgitate gut contents, increasing the chances of transmitting the pathogen. These methods of tick removal should be avoided

(Source: CDC)

Logistics: “. . the branch of military science dealing with the procurement, maintenance, and movement of equipment, supplies, and personnel.”

PART ONE – THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL

The Continental winter camp at Valley Forge in 1777- 78 is the stuff of legend. A pitiable, cold, starving army in rags perseveres through all hardship to emerge in the spring ready to fight and win. Skeptics will point out that it really wasn’t all that tough a winter from a meteorologi- cal point of view; the succeeding winter at Morristown, NJ was far more intense. But for the men who were there, it was a time of real hardship. More than the cold, the lack of clothing, food, fuel, and every necessity of life were made more bitter by the knowledge that the British were only a few miles away in the warmth and comfort of their late capitol, Philadelphia. Why the logistical failure at Valley Forge –why the inability of the Continentals to support themselves in the field?

With this article we start a four-part series in Dispatches on logistics of the Continental Army – – the planning and execution necessary to support an American army in the field. It will give you information for your reenact- ment and interpretation of that world of 250 years ago. Easy enough to call up the militia, appoint the generals and colonels, and plan a campaign. But who brings the ammo and the flints? Where are the tents and kitchen gear? Who collects the food? Where are the wagons and carts to carry everything? Where do the horses and oxen come from to pull the wagons – and who feeds those? How does an army stay in one place for months and not suck dry the surrounding countryside? Or how does it move twenty miles, or two hundred, and expect to find everything it needs along the way and at the other end? And how did a collection of colonies with no experience or logistics structure instantaneously create the people and processes necessary to do all of these things and a million more?

The coming installments on Logistics are:

• Part I. The Quartermaster General
• Part II. Transport and Forage
• Part III. Subsistence and Clothing
• Part IV. Ordinance

THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL

It’s to the credit of the Continental Congress that within weeks of the April 1775 deployment of an American militia army at Boston, they authorized creation of the necessary staff offices to provide for the Army’s needs. Even before Washington arrived to take command, in June and July 1775 Congress authorized appointment of a Quartermaster General (actually with the rank of Colonel), and a Commissary General of Stores and Provisions. They later added a Hospital Department, Commissary of Military Stores (Ordinance), and a Clothier General. It was left to the new Commander the task of actually filling these positions, and those of other specialists who would work under them. We’ll begin in this issue with what the Continental Congress and the army began with – the first essential ingredients of army logistics – a Quartermaster General (QMG).

Washington filled this most important logistical position in August 1775 with appointment of Major Thomas Mifflin, a 31-year-old Philadelphia merchant then serving as one of his aides. Mifflin’s tenure represents the first of three QMG phases in the history of the Continental Army.

The Mifflin Era: August 1775 – October 1777

Exactly what did a QMG do? The definition in the 18th century was essentially that of Chief of Staff, responsible for almost every aspect of the army’s existence. The following list is indicative of the job as Mifflin developed it in 1775. Later QMGs split the duties into lesser depart- ments and subordinate offices. But in the beginning, when the army was stationary and closely grouped around Boston, Mifflin oversaw everything.

The scope of the QMG included gathering intelligence on enemy movements and plans; planning troop marches and deployments; distribution of movement and supply orders; opening and repair of roads; provision for water transport – bridges or boats; laying out of the camp and its defenses; the procurement of camp equipment, tents, lumber, etc; provision of firewood; procurement of horses, oxen, pack animals, and their forage; provision and maintenance of transport wagons, carts, packing cases and leather gear; and over all, providing the commander with a staff director to coordinate any and all other activities.

It’s important here to note the several large areas of re- sponsibility not under his jurisdiction. One was Ordinance. Duties of the QMG applied only to supporting the needs of the troops of the line. The QMG did not play in the business of artillery, munitions, and related services. That job was under the control of the Commis- sary of Military Stores, who would report to the Chief of Artillery. We’ll discuss him in Part IV of this series. Another piece missing from the QMG’s pie was person- nel management. He did not take care of the individual troops in terms of enlistments, promotions, pay, discipline, etc. That role belonged to the Adjutant General.

When Congress authorized a QMG for the main army at Boston, it also shortly established a policy to designate deputy QMGs to serve in expected geographical departments (northern, central, and southern) and assistant QMGs to serve with any other armies fielded besides the main forces under Washington. As things developed, the QMG structure included deputies appointed for a northern department (New England and Canada), and the states of the southern department (Virginia, Carolinas, Georgia). Other assistant QMGs were established with specific forces, such as Gates’ northern army and Greene’s southern army, when those came into existence. Later, each army brigade would designate a QMG to provide for the battalions of that unit. Needless to say, the potential for overlapping and disconnected exercise of responsibilities was inevi- table, since there were both geographic and unit – based QMGs working in the same locations to service the same forces.

At Boston, Mifflin set up three field offices to provide logistics services to the army. Since the army was in static positions, many of the functions related to troop move- ment were not required, yet. To provide QM support to the 17,000-man army, Mifflin’s immediate organization was staffed by a total of 28 officers, enlisted men, and civilians. We can understand their tasks by reading their titles. These included clerks of accounts, camp equipment clerks, (fire) woodsmen, lumberyard supervisors, smiths, armorers, nailers, carpenters, wagon masters, and barrack masters. In addition, Mifflin utilized various merchants in the area of Boston to serve as his purchasing agents for every kind of good needed. They received a commission of 2% for everything delivered to the army. While this staff organized and managed the logistical support efforts, there were obviously innumerable workers among the troops and hired civilians who aided in accomplishing the many tasks of supply.

As the war moved from Boston to New York, and then to the Jerseys, Mifflin and his staff moved with them. He briefly was nominated for a field command, to be replaced by Stephen Moylan – a shipping merchant. But he had done such a good job that members of Congress and Washington himself prevailed upon Mifflin to stay with the QMG assignment. During 1776 – 77 Philadelphia became the center of Mifflin’s efforts to collect and distribute supplies and equipment to the army. It also became the focus of his efforts to further develop his organization. He lobbied Congress, and with Washing- ton’s support, it enacted legislation for several new offices reporting to the QMG. Congress created the Forage and Wagon departments, and authorized Mifflin to select a Deputy and other assistants to lead the subordinate offic- es. From the end of 1776, Mifflin spent little actual time in the field with the army. He appointed his Deputy, Col. Henry Lutterloh, as the commanding officer in the field for the QM organization.

No complete organizational plan or unit return for the QMG survives from this period, but fragmentary evidence shows a fairly well developed operation for supporting Continental forces, both with the main army and elsewhere. The concept was to develop a widespread web of purchasing agents responsible for obtaining sup- plies from across the colonies, particularly in the better- developed and prosperous areas, such as the counties just west of Philadelphia. These supplies and equipment would be transported by the QM department via roads or water to the operating location(s) of the army, or to any other designated point, such as the selected location of the coming winter’s camp. Of course, a flow of sup- plies required a continuing flow of funds from Congress or the colonies. Mifflin maintained a small office with a Colonel and four assistants in Philadelphia, to deal with Congress, handle correspondence with the field, and to coordinate supply collections and deliveries in the capital. There were deputy QMG offices in Albany (Northern Department), Boston (Eastern Department), Fishkill, NY (Washington’s army), and Williamsburg, VA (Southern Department). Also, assistant deputies QMGs were located in areas where Mifflin had established sup- ply sources, mostly in the counties around Philadelphia. These included Easton, Reading, Carlisle, and Lancaster, plus Wilmington, DE.

Mifflin had created a pipeline process whereby funds from Congress were sent to the QMG agents around the colonies, who bought supplies and equipment from local merchants and artificers, and then had them transported to the QMG organization at the army’s current or future location. The geographically located QMGs and the subordinate agents would work at either end of the pro- cess, serving as supply sources for materials and products originating in their own areas, and then forwarding them to the needed location. If the army was to be in their area of responsibility, they would serve as the receiving agent to accept the supplies flowing from more distant locations.

The financing for this system came directly from Con- gress. While they might get by with not paying the troops for months or years, the delivery of food, tents, and transport required the funds necessary for immediate payment. The patriotism of most merchants and traders of the colonies did not extend to bankrupting themselves to supply the army’s needs. In the beginning, funding and in-kind supplies provided by the colonies to Con- gress did a reasonable job of meeting the needs of the army, and Mifflin did a creditable job of supplying the army through the campaign of 1777. We will see what he and his successors accomplished in more detail in the next three parts of this series.

But Mifflin was not an enthusiastic QMG. He had always wanted a field command (and a Generalship), and had never felt dedicated to the task of supply manager. With the British capture of Philadelphia in the fall of 1777, Congress fled to York, PA, and Mifflin, his orga- nization disrupted, fled to Reading Pennsylvania. There he was overtaken by a deep depression. He pleaded with Congressional friends to allow him to quit the job of QMG and gain a field command. Thus began the events that would make the winter of 177-78 at Valley Forge among the darkest hours for the American army.

Mifflin told Congress he was resigning as QMG, field command or no. In November 1777, Congress ac- cepted his resignation, but asked Mifflin to continue in service until a successor was appointed. Washington was informed of this development, and the Deputy QMG, Lutterlow, was to continue to provide support in the field. But Mifflin refused to continue as acting QMG. He completely abandoned his post, telling Congress, but not informing Washington or Colonel Lutterlow.

It would take Congress four months to select the next QMG, and in the interim, there was no one in charge of the supply process that should have been preparing for the winter camp of 1777-78. For several months, as far as can be determined now, Washington thought Mifflin was still working to prepare the winter camp. By the time Washington and Lutterlow found out that Mifflin was gone, it was too late. Lutterlow, in the field with Washington, did not have Mifflin’s contacts or access to funds to prepare a supply buildup at the winter camp.

Washington had no one to turn to for coordination of purchases, collection, and transport from distant points to his winter quarters. Congress, and most of its staff, were scattered around western Pennsylvania. The result – when the army moved in to the Valley Forge encamp- ment, there were no supplies, no transport, no forage for animals, and no planning or arrangements of any kind for logistical needs in the months ahead. It was not until March 1778 that a committee from Congress, visiting the camp, and appalled at conditions, begged General Nathaniel Greene to accept the post of QMG. Greene, a brilliant field commander, took the job for only one reason. Washington joined Congress in begging him to assume the post, and Greene accepted out of his personal loyalty and devotion to Washington. And so a second unwilling officer is drafted as QMG.

The Greene Era:
March 1778 – August 1780

Major General Nathaniel Green assumed his duties in March 1778. Member of a prosperous manufacturing family from Rhode Island, he was knowledgeable in the needs of fund- ing, purchasing, and other supply concepts. He immediately renewed and expanded the staff and operating concepts of Mifflin. Unlike Mifflin, Greene stayed with Washington in the field. He established a quartermaster representative with each brigade of the army, and selected a staff of his own consisting of a deputy, a wagon master, a commissary general, and auditor of accounts, and various clerks. He assigned one of his immediate assistants, Charles Petit, to establish an office in Philadelphia once the city was liberated, and assigned another, John Cox, as his traveling agent for purchases and inspector of stores. He did not change the concept of assistant QMGs in the geographic departments, nor the use of deputies serving as agents for procurement in the counties of Pennsylvania and other areas. In fact, the organization grew to such size that Congress and Greene’s critics soon accused him of creating an empire. If there was one thing Greene could do, it was build the bureaucracy!

The reports to Congress of these excesses provide the kind of interesting details that otherwise would not be available for us two hundred plus years later. In Philadelphia alone, Greene had a deputy, John Mitchell, who employed a bookkeeper, a cashkeeper, several messengers and clerks, three porters, an assistant for boats, who in turn employed the masters, mates, and complete crews for three schooners, a wagon master general and six wagon masters, a superintendent of wood and boards, superintendent of barracks, superintendent of stables, plus 25 or so other employees such as wheelwrights, hostlers, and conductors. (We find out what a conduc- tor does in Part II.) Greene also grew the organization at the state level. Along with the department QMGs, he developed deputies and assistants in the various states, each with their own staffs numbering, on average, about 30 to 40 individuals. By 1780, the grand total, as best we can determine now, amounted to the QMG (Green), two assistant QMGs, 28 deputy QMGs, 109 assis- tant deputy QMGs, and a total staff in all departments and functions of over 3,000. This, at a time when the army, on average, numbered 10,000, and never exceeded about 24,000. It’s only fair to understand that this quantity of staff was spread over the entire geographic area of the coun- try, and their job was to gather the products and resources of the colonies and get them to the armies wherever needed. Nonetheless, it appears a lot of empire building was going on.

At a time when the QMG was growing, its ability to provide for the army was rapidly diminished, through no fault of its own. Although supplying the army’s needs for the campaign of 1778 was accomplished, and Washington was satisfied with Greene’s performance, the financial situation for Congress was reaching a crisis. Having run out of funds backed by hard currency, the Congress and the states were beginning to rely exclu- sively on paper specie, backed only by the promises of the government. The inevitable result was hyperinflation and the finances of the QMG were soon “not worth a Continental”.

“The cloud thickens, and the prospects are daily grow-
ing darker. There is now no hope of cash. The agents are loaded with heavy debts, and perplexed with half-finished contracts, and the people clamorous of their pay, refusing to proceed in the public business unless their present demands are discharged. The constant run of expenses, incident to the department, presses hard for further credit, or immediate supplies of money. To extend one is impossible; to obtain the other, we have not the least prospect. I see nothing, therefore, but a general check, if not an absolute stop, to the progress of every branch of business in the whole department. It is folly to expect that this expensive department can be long supported on credit.”

Letter: Greene to Washington, December 1780

The combination of bloated staff combined with the ballooning budget requirements, brought unwelcome attention from Congress to Greene and his operations. He had successfully completed logistical support for the campaign of 1779. But Congressional investigation of the size of his staff, accusations of excessive commissions being earned by his agents, and the financial crisis caused by the worthless currency and credit of the colonies, brought an end for Greene as the QMG. Congress ad- dressed both of the perceived problems – staff size and financial failure. They told Greene to reduce his staff and change the way his agents were paid. To reduce the costs of the department, they also took away two of the major QM responsibilities – provision of forage, and provision of transport. These were handed over to the individual colonies, to be apportioned among them based on the forces located within their territory. With this wholesale destruction of his organization, Greene did what Congress fully expected – he resigned August 5th, 1780. Fortunately, there was no major campaign by the main army in the summer of 1780, and the depar- ture of Greene, with a two month delay until his replace- ment arrived, did not cause Washington a hardship.

The Pickering Era: October 1780 – July 1785

Colonel Timothy Pickering was a lawyer and politician from Massachusetts, was serving as the Adjutant General, and also as a member of the Continental Congress’s Board of War. He was one of those very critical of Greene’s management of the QMG, and he was not enthusiastic to find himself placed in the same position, facing the same problems. But he began with acceptance of the politi- cal climate, which called for downsizing and frugality. He reduced the number of deputies and assistants, for example combining the Pennsylvania organization’s 7 or 8 assistants down to a single deputy.

Pickering found the conduct of Quartermaster business handicapped by the lack of credit and the effects of a de- preciated currency. Fully aware of these difficulties at the time of his appointment, he proposed the use of ‘’specie certificates,” which called for payment in specie at a given date for all articles or services purchased on credit. In effect, he sought credit from suppliers, but credit which could be circulated. If payment was delayed, such certificates were to bear an interest rate of 6 per cent a year until paid. Congress authorized their use; thereby enabling Pickering to obtain a few more supplies than would otherwise have been possible.

Often Pickering would have to fall back on a last and most desperate measure to supply the army – an impressment warrant. Whenever the need for supplies or material reached a critical point, and the finances were lacking, the QMG would go to Washington and request a warrant for the impressment – seizure – of the needed items from the surrounding countryside. This tactic was employed more and more often as the war continued, and the finances of the Congress and colonies became more desperate. Throughout the war, however, Pickering continued to be so plagued by the lack of funds that he wrote Congress: “If any other man can, without money, carry on the extensive business of this department, I wish most sincerely he would take my place. I confess myself incapable of doing it.”

Harassed by lack of funds and scarcity of supplies, Pickering nevertheless, in consultation with Washington and acting in the double capacity of consulting member of the Board of War and Quartermaster General of the Army, achieved one of the greatest logistical accomplish- ments of the war. He provided for the successful trans- portation, mostly by water, of the entire American and

French force from the Hudson in New York to the James River in Virginia for the siege of Yorktown and the cap- ture of Cornwallis. We’ll learn more of this feat in the next installment of this series – “Transport and Forage”.

After Yorktown, Pickering continued to serve for the remainder of the war. For the most part, he was concerned with affecting various economies in the Quartermaster’s Department and attempting to settle his accounts as quickly as possible. He wrote Robert Morris that ‘’until I accepted this cursed office, though necessity compelled me to live frugally, yet I had the satisfaction of keeping nearly clear of private debts,” that he was now much indebted. He wanted nothing more than a quick settle- ment of accounts and an opportunity to return to private life, where he might set about repairing the fortunes of his family. This settlement dragged on for many months after the war had ended, and Pickering did not relinquish his post until the Quartermaster’s Department was abol- ished on July 25, 1785.

Stay tuned for the next installment – Part II – Transport and Forage

Copyright © 2010 Joe Wagner. All rights reserved.

“…I am no advocate for blindly following the maxims of European policy.”

Part I of this article examined the British and Ameri- can training manuals in use and available for study by American leaders during the War of Independence. This part will examine those French and German (mainly Prussian) manuals that were also available and widely read.

During the Seven Years War in Europe, the Prussian infantry enjoyed the preeminent position as the finest on any field. Their discipline and ability to maneuver, sometimes under very difficult conditions, marked them as the infantry to be emulated. When the Prussian drill manual of 1757 (later adapted in 1759) appeared, it was widely copied. It also formed the basis of the British ‘64’ manual (see Part I). English language translations and adaptations soon appeared to wide acclaim. Indeed, during this period anything vaguely “Prussian” enjoyed wide popularity. For example, note George Washing- ton’s interest in Frederick the Great’s The King of Prus- sia’s Instruction to his Generals, published in English in 1760.

Prior to the Seven Years War, the French excelled in many areas of military endeavor. In the 17th and early 18th Centuries, Marshal Sebastien de Vauban led the way in military engineering and siegecraft. Yet in the aftermath of the humiliating defeat of 1763, the French cast about to improve their battlefield performance. Beginning in 1764, General Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval standardized gunnery and ordnance. In the ten years preceding the American War of Independence, a pro- longed debate evolved over battle tactics. This argument pitted advocates of heavy, massed infantry formations (l’ordre profond) assaulting with the bayonet, against those favoring linear tactics (l’ordre mince). The heavy column concept was originally championed by the Chevalier Jean-Charles de Follard in the 1730s. In the 1760s and 1770s, Marshal de Bellisle and François-Jean de Mesnil-Durand also favored columnar tactics.

Comte Turpin de Crissé had already set forth his ideas on light infantry in his 1754 Essai sur l’Art de la Guerre. In 1766, the Comte de Guibert presented the French War Ministry with a memorandum introduc- ing a compromise identified as l’ordre mixte. This memorandum, subsequently refined and published in 1772 as the Essai général de tactique, stressed flexibil- ity and utility. Infantrymen, trained for both line and light infantry tactics, could deploy in line or column, or a combination of both, depending on the tactical situation. Guibert’s manual has been called the most important military book of the 18th Century. By the end of 1778, most French officers became disciples of the mixed order, even though the French Army did not formally adopt Guibert’s ideas until the Reglément of 1791, when they became the tactical norm during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Guibert’s manual was a particular favorite of Washington, who also familiarized himself with Mesnil-Durand’s writings. The writings of de Saxe and Guibert also contributed to the intense interest in petite guerre, or partisan operations, which seemed to fit the “natural genius” of Americans for ranger operations in the North American wilderness. Generals John Forbes and Henri Bouquet (a Swiss in the British service) had turned to several European thinkers to solve the problems of operating with regular and provincial troops in the American forests.

Forbes based his successful 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne in the French and Indian War on Turpin de Crissé’s Commentaire. Washington served as a brigade commander in this campaign. Bouquet refined Forbes’ techniques during Pontiac’s rebellion by consulting de Saxe’s Mes Revêries, a posthumous work published in French and English in 1757. De Saxe had paid particu- lar attention to aimed musketry in skirmishing opera- tions, and emphasized combined arms training by infan- try, artillery and cavalry. Bouquet’s “Reflections on War with the Savages of North America” appeared in 1765 as an appendix to William Smith’s A Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians in the Year MDCCLXIV. Both de Saxe and Guibert had forcefully argued that Roman military history demonstrated that regular line infantry could function in broken terrain if they were trained as light infantry.

In summary, on 8 May 1777, Washington expressly or- dered all Continental officers to read “military authors” in their spare time. French and German professional soldiers noted that they readily obeyed. Captain Johann von Ewald, a Hessian Jäger officer who became a lead- ing theorist of light infantry tactics after the Revolution, commented on this fact: “I was sometimes astonished when American baggage fell into our hands…to see how every wretched knapsack, in which were only two shirts and a pair of torn breeches, would